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IL STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the district court's judgment denying Mr. Philip Leonard's petition 
for post-conviction relief following an evidentiary hearing. 
B. General Course of Proceedings 
1. Underlying criminal proceedings 
In January 2009, a detective went to Mr. Leonard's home to confront him with 
accusations that he had sexual intercourse with a twelve-year old girl, H.B. NPD Report Dated 
1-8-2009, p. 1. 1 Mr. Leonard agreed to speak with the detective and the detective transp011ed 
him to the police station where he was advised of his rights pursuant to 1\1iranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. 436 (1966). Id. Mr. Leonard, who was twenty-one at the time, acknowledged knowing 
B.B. because he was friends with her older brother but denied any sexual contact. Id. The 
detective informed Mr. Leonard that this was his opportunity to tell his side of the story because 
the detective already had B.B.'s "statement, some My Space information, possible surveillance 
video and DNA evidence that would lead [the detective] to believe that he had some sort of 
sexual contact with her." Id. Mr. Leonard then admitted to being alone with B.B. and that she 
had tried to kiss him but continued to deny any sexual contact. Id. at p. 2. 
The detective asked Mr. Leonard to submit to a polygraph examination and Mr. Leonard 
agreed but indicated he could not take the test that day as he had a job interview within an hour. 
Id. The detective agreed to transport Mr. Leonard to the police station the following day for the 
1 This and other police rep011s are attached to the Presentence Report ("PSI"), of which 
the district court took judicial notice and is included in the appellate record. R. l 
polygraph. Id. Mr. Leonard phoned the detective later that in the day and told him he had 
contacted an attorney, who advised him to submit to the polygraph if he was telling the truth. Id. 
Mr. Leonard indicated that he still planned to take the polygraph but was very apprehensive 
about what would happen if he came in and took the polygraph. Id. The detective told Mr. 
Leonard that he would not go to jail after the polygraph "and if he came in and told the truth and 
passed the polygraph and his statements were still the same, he would more than likely be 
eliminated as a suspect in this matter." Id. at p. 2-3. 
The detective transported Mr. Leonard to the police station the following afternoon where 
a second detective who would administer the polygraph advised Mr. Leonard of his rights 
pursuant to Miranda. Id. at p. 3. Mr. Leonard "agreed to take the polygraph, but said he did not 
want to discuss anything after the polygraph." Id. After the polygraph, the detective asked Mr. 
Leonard if he wanted to know "how the test went and wanted to know what the test results were 
and talk about it" and Mr. Leonard said that he did. Id. Both detectives confronted Mr. Leonard 
with the fact that he failed the polygraph, told him that they knew he was not telling the truth 
and in light of that failure and the other evidence against him, "it was not looking good for his 
part." Id. 
Mr. Leonard invoked his right to counsel and the first detective gave Mr. Leonard a ride 
back to his residence. Id. En route, Mr. Leonard asked the detective about the process and the 
detective indicated the case would be presented to a grand jury. Id. As Mr. Leonard exited the 
detective's vehicle "he asked me how long it would take to come to the police department and 
confess" and that he did not "have money to hire an attorney." Id. at p. 3-4. Mr. Leonard asked 
how the detective could appoint him an attorney or how he could obtain one at public expense. 
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Id. at p. 4. The detective said Mr. Leonard would only be appointed an attorney after being 
aITested. Id. Mr. Leonard "said he felt he should just come and explain ... what had really 
happened." After arriving at the police station, Mr. Leonard was again advised of his lvfiranda 
rights and admitted to sexual contact with B.B. 
Mr. Leonard was charged by indictment with lewd conduct with a minor and the public 
defender was appointed to represent him. R. 118. Mr. Leonard told his attorney that he had 
invoked his right to counsel and believed his confession might be suppressible. R. 125. The 
attorney reviewed the police reports and determined that a motion to suppress would not succeed 
because Mr. Leonard was not in custody when he asked the detective to return him to the police 
station. Tr. p. 38, ln. 22 - p. 39, ln. 1. Relying on his attorney's advice that he could not suppress 
his statements, Mr. Leonard pled guilty. See Tr. CR-2009-5405 (5-8-2009)2 p. 12, ln. 3-10. The 
district court sentenced Mr. Leonard to a unified term of twenty years with a minimum period of 
confinement of five years. R. 119. The district court retained jurisdiction but ultimately 
relinquished jurisdiction and imposed the original sentence. Id. Upon Mr. Leonard's motion 
pursuant to J.C.R. 35, the district court reduced the fixed term to three years. Id. at 119-20. 
2. Post-conviction proceedings 
Mr. Leonard filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel because his attorney did not conduct an adequate investigation, did not file 
a motion to suppress and pressured him to plead guilty. R. 7. Mr. Leonard also alleged that the 
PSI investigator made biased comments that deprived him of due process. After the district court 
Transcripts from the criminal proceedings were considered by the district court and are 
included as exhibits in this appeal. 
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denied the state's motion for summary dismissal, the matter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. 
Mr. Leonard testified at the evidentiary hearing testimony that "he believed that he had a valid 
motion to suppress based on the fact that he had asked for the assistance of counsel during the 
interview by law enforcement, that no attorney was provided to him, and that he later confessed." 
See R. 134. Trial counsel testified that he reviewed the discovery including the discovery 
relevant to Mr. Leonard's confession and that he determined there was not a valid argument for 
suppression of Mr. Leonard's confession. Id. 
In a memorandum opinion, the district court found that Mr. Leonard's constitutional 
rights were not violated by the PSI's recommendation that sentence be imposed. R. 129-31. The 
district court also determined that Mr. Leonard did not prove that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel due to his attorney's failure to explore an alibi defense or that his attorney 
coerced him into pleading guilty. R. 133-34, 135-38. With regard to counsel's failure to move to 
suppress Mr. Leonard's confession, the district court found: 
A separate review of the information attached to the PSI which Leonard asked this 
court to consider, confirms that the confession objected to by Leonard was freely 
and voluntarily given by Leonard after he had received Miranda warnings while 
he was not in custody. Leonard had been transported home by the investigating 
officers after he failed a polygraph and asked for an attorney. He thereafter 
volunteered to return with the officers to the police station to provide a 
confession. He was reminded at this juncture that he was not in custody and could 
leave when he wished. He was then transported back to the police station where 
he was again given his Miranda rights before he confessed. Even though he had 
previously asked for an attorney, when the officers transported Leonard home in 
response, Leonard voluntarily offered to return with them to the police station to 
tell them the accurate story about what happened. They told him he was not in 
custody and could change his mind at any time and they would return him home. 
In contrast to Leonard's assertion, the post-conviction trial evidence supports [trial 
counsel's] assessment and tactical decision not to file a motion to suppress in this 
case. 
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R. 135. The district court thereafter entered final judgment in favor of the state and denied Mr. 
Leonard's post-conviction claims. R. 140-41. This appeal follows. 
III. ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Leonard's petition for post-conviction relief 
because he proved that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel's failure to file 
a motion to suppress? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Pertinent Legal Standards 
An application for post-conviction relief initiates a proceeding that is ci vii in nature. State 
v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676,678,662 P.2d 548,550 (1983); Mendiola v. State, 150 Idaho 345, 
348,247 P.3d 210,213 (Ct. App. 2010). An applicant is entitled to post-conviction relief when 
he proves his allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. LC. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 
Idaho 865,801 P.2d 1216 (1990); Mendiola, 150 Idaho at 348, 247 P.3d at 213. When reviewing 
a decision denying post-conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, this Court will disturb the 
lower court's factual findings if they are clearly erroneous and exercises free review of the district 
court's application of the relevant law to the facts. Mendiola, 150 Idaho at 348, 247 P.3d at 213. 
The right of a criminal defendant to counsel during trial is guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, (1963); 
Milburn v. State, 130 Idaho 649,652, 946 P.2d 71, 74 (Ct. App. 1997). A defendant claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel will prevail if he shows that (1) counsel's performance was 
deficient and, that (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 687. A defendant meets the deficiency prong when counsel's performance falls below an 
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objective standard of reasonableness. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 
(1998); Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 (1988). The prejudice prong is 
met when the defendant shows that there is a reasonable probability that. but for counsel's errors, 
the result of the proceedings would have been different. Aragon, 114 Idaho at 761, 760 P.2d at 
1177; Afitchell, 132 Idaho at 277, 971 P.2d at 730. 
In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a motion in the 
underlying criminal action, the district court may consider the probability of success of the motion 
in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent performance. 
Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 1 177 P.3d 362, 369 (2008); Lint v. State, 145 Idaho 472,477, 
180 P .3d 511, 516 (Ct. App. 2008). Where the alleged deficiency is counsel's failure to file a 
motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not have been granted by the trial court, is 
generally determinative of both prongs of the Strickland test. Hoffman v. State, __ Idaho~' 
_, 277 P.3d 1050, 1056 (Ct. App. 201 Boman v. State, 129 Idaho 520, 526, 927 P.2d 910, 
916 (Ct. App. 1996). Conversely, counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress that could have 
succeeded and altered the outcome of the case constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. See 
Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 157, 177 P.3d at 371; Lint, 145 Idaho at 480, 180 P.3d at 519. 
B. Because the District Court Would Have Erred in Denying a Motion to Suppress Mr. 
Leonard's Confession, Mr. Leonard Proved He Received Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel for His Attorney's Failure to File Such a Motion 
The Miranda Court adopted a set of prophylactic measures to protect a suspect's Fifth 
Amendment right from the "inherently compelling pressures" of custodial interrogation because 
"incommunicado interrogation" in an "unfamiliar," "police-dominated atmosphere," involves 
psychological pressures that can undermine the individual's will to resist and "to compel him to 
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speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. 1213, 1219 
(2010), citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456--457. To counteract the coercive pressure, Miranda 
announced that police officers must warn a suspect prior to questioning that he has a right to 
remain silent, and a right to the presence of an attorney. Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1219; State v. 
Hurst, 151 Idaho 430,433,258 P.3d 950,953 (Ct. App. 2011). "A person may not invoke a Fifth 
Amendment right to counsel, with the prophylactic effect of cutting off questioning without an 
attorney present, if the person is not in custody." Hurst, 151 ldaho at 436,258 P.3d at 956. 
Ordinarily, the state can establish that a defendant waived his right to remain silent and to 
have the assistance of an attorney by showing that the "waiver was knowing, intelligent, and 
voluntary under the 'high standar[d] of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights [set forth in] 
Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938)."' Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 
1219, citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475; see also Hurst, 151 Idaho at 433-34, 258 P.3d at 953-54. 
Nevertheless, the Zerbst 's traditional standard for waiver is insufficient to protect a suspect's right 
to have counsel present at a subsequent interrogation if he had previously requested counsel. The 
United States Supreme Court held in Edwards v. Arizona: 
when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial 
interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only 
that he responded to further police-initiated custodial intenogation even if he has 
been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, ... having expressed 
his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further 
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, 
unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or 
conversations with the police. 
451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (footnote omitted). 
Here, the district court found that trial counsel correctly detennined no motion to suppress 
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should be filed because Mr. Leonard was no longer in custody when he agreed to return to the 
police station with the detective. However, because Mr. Leonard validly invoked his right to 
counsel at the police station, the fact he was not actively being detained when he agreed to return 
to the police station is not detern1inativc. Further, acting on the advice on an attorney, Mr. 
Leonard attempted to limit the scope of the interrogation and invoked the right to counsel. 
Although Mr. Leonard initiated a generalized conversation regarding the investigation, that 
initiation alone did not constitute a waiver of his previously invoked right to counsel. 
Further, the totality of the circumstances show that Mr. Leonard did not validly waive his 
previously invoked right to counsel and, therefore, the district court should have granted a motion 
to suppress had counsel filed one. It was objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to fail to file a 
motion to suppress that would have prevented Mr. Leonard's confession from being admitted at 
trial. Further, had counsel filed the motion and the confession been suppressed, there is a 
reasonable probability that Mr. Leonard would not have pled guilty but, rather, would have 
insisted on going to trial. Accordingly, Mr. Leonard established that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel and the district court erred in denying his petition for post-conviction relief. 
1. Mr. Leonard validly invoked his right to counsel 
The district court found that Mr. Leonard's confession was not suppressible because he 
was not in custody when he volunteered to return to the police station and confess. However, 
once a suspect validly invokes the right to counsel, the prohibition against interrogation without 
counsel remains in force after the person is no longer in custody. 
The "Edwards disability" remains after release from Miranda custody until its lingering 
effects have dissipated, the accused has "regained a sense of control or normalcy" and had the 
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ability '·10 seek advice from an attorney, family members, and friends." Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 
1221-22. In Shatzer, the United Supreme Court specified that a period fourteen days is sufficient 
to allow "the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, 
and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody." Shatzer, 130 S.Ct. at 1223. 
Here, Mr. Leonard agreed to return to the police station as soon as the detective arrived at 
his house. Thus, Mr. Leonard had no opportunity to a sense of normalcy and seek the 
advice of attorneys and families and, rather, remained in law enforcement's presence. 
Accordingly, the "Edwards disability" remained in effect although Mr. Leonard may have been 
out of custody when he agreed to return to the police station. 
It is not clear from the district court's opinion whether it concluded that Mr. Leonard was 
not in custody for purposes of A1iranda when he asked for an attorney, though trial counsel 
testified that he did not believe there was a suppression issue because Mr. Leonard was not in 
custody when he asked for an attorney. Tr. p. 38, In. - p. 39, In. 1. However, the totality of the 
circumstances demonstrates that Mr. Leonard validly invoked his right to counsel. 
Although Mr. Leonard went to the police station voluntarily and the officer told him that 
he was not under arrest, those facts are not dispositive of the question of Miranda custody. See 
State v. Afedrano, 123 Idaho 114,117,844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992). Instead, courts look 
to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation including the time and location 
of the interrogation, the conduct of the officers, the nature and manner of the questioning, and the 
presence of other persons and determine whether a reasonable person would believe his freedom 
of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest. State v. James, 148 
Idaho 574,577,225 P.3d 1169, 1172 (2010); Hurst, 151 [daho at 436,258 P.3d at 956. 
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After being advised of his Afiranda rights, Mr. Leonard agreed to submit to a polygraph 
examination but reiterated that he did not want to discuss anything after the polygraph. Mr. 
Leonard then answered questions relevant to the investigation and provided other highly personal 
details. Both detectives entered the room with Mr. Leonard and tantalized him by asking if he 
wanted to know the polygraph results notwithstanding his prior limitation on the waiver of his 
rights by indicating that he did not want to discuss the polygraph. After Mr. Leonard indicated 
that he \Vanted to know the polygraph results, the detectives told him that he failed and that they 
knew he was lying. The detectives questioned Mr. Leonard about "his relationship" with B.B. and 
told him that "it was not looking good for his part" in light of all the evidence they had against 
him, which according to the prior interrogation included DNA evidence. Mr. Leonard then 
invoked his right to counsel. 
Mr. Leonard was isolated and in a police dominated atmosphere - the coercive nature of 
this atmosphere was enhanced by the fact Mr. Leonard arrived at the police station with the 
detective and relied on him for transportation back to his residence. Additionally, Mr. Leonard 
submitted to a polygraph, a procedure most people would find quite intimidating even if it did not 
involve the highly personal questions presented to Mr. Leonard. After the test, the two detectives 
disregarded Mr. Leonard's earlier attempt to limit the scope of his waiver and asked if he wanted 
to know the results. When Mr. Leonard said he did, the detectives confronted Mr. Leonard, told 
him he was lying and that with all the evidence they had, things were not looking good. A 
reasonable person in these circumstances would believe his freedom was restricted to a degree 
associated with arrest at the time Mr. Leonard invoked his right to counsel. 
Even if no kfiranda warnings would been required in these circumstances, the rule in 
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Hurst - that a person must be in custody to invoke their right to counsel should not be extended 
to circumstances such as these where the suspect was actually informed he has the right to counsel 
and then invoked that right when in a highly coercive environment. In Hurst, police approached 
the suspect at the lobby of his work place. No Afiranda warnings were given but the suspect said 
he would not speak to them without an attorney present. The Court of Appeals held that the 
suspect's indication he would not speak to the officer without an attorney was not an invocation of 
the Fifth Amendment right to counsel because he was not in custody. Hurst, 151 Idaho at 436, 
258 P.3d at 956. The circumstances of this case are distinguishable because the detectives 
informed Mr. Leonard that he had the right to an attorney before interrogation and the 
interrogation proceeded under coercive circumstances. It cannot be said that Mr. Leonard had no 
right to invoke the right police informed him that he had, even if the circumstances were not 
coercive enough to trigger the requirement that the warnings be given. 
Mr. Leonard validly invoked his right to counsel during a custodial interrogation. Thus, a 
valid waiver of that right could not be established by showing only that Mr. Leonard responded to 
further interrogation even if he was no longer in custody when he agreed to the re-interrogation. 
The district court therefore erred in concluding that Mr. Leonard's confession was not 
suppressible because he was not in custody when he agreed to return to the police station. 
2. Although Mr. Leonard Initiated Further Conversation, He Did Not Validly 
Waive His Previously Invoked Right to Counsel 
The district court concluded that "the confession objected to by Leonard was freely and 
voluntarily given by Leonard after he had received A1iranda warnings while he was not in 
custody." Ifowever, although Mr. Leonard apparently initiated a generalized discussion with the 
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custody." However, although Mr. Leonard apparently initiated a generalized discussion with the 
detective on the ride back to his residence, the state still would have been required to show that he 
validly waived his previously invoked right to counsel a showing that could not have been met 
by simply showing Mr. Leonard received his Miranda rights for a third time. Moreover, Mr. 
Leonard was transported back to the police station where he experienced the same police 
dominated and coercive atmosphere that led to his first invocation of the right to counsel. Mr. 
Leonard did not validly waive his right to counsel during the subsequent interrogation and any 
motion to suppress should have been granted. 
Once an individual in custody invokes his to counsel, interrogation "must cease until 
an attorney is present" and "the individual must have an opportunity to confer with the attorney 
and to have him present during any subsequent questioning." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474. Even if 
the accused initiates a conversation after invoking the right to counsel, "where reinterrogation 
follows, the burden remains upon the prosecution to show that subsequent events indicated a 
waiver of the Fifth Amendment right to have counsel present during the interrogation." Oregon v. 
Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1044 (1983). Moreover, given that the accused "expressed his own 
view that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice, a later decision at 
the authorities' insistence to make a statement without counsel's presence may properly be viewed 
with skepticism." Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 681 (1988). 
U.S. 96, 110, n. 2 (1975) (Justice White concurring in result). 
Michigan v, A1osley, 423 
The totality of the circumstances surrounding Mr. Leonard's decision to return to the 
police station without consulting an attorney was neither knowing nor intelligent and, instead, the 
product of the lingering effects of the coercive interrogation and misinformation. Before Mr. 
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Leonard exited the detective's vehicle upon arrival at his residence, he inquired how an attorney 
could be made available to him at public expense, pursuant to the advisory he was given. NPD 
Report Dated 1-8-2009, p. 3 The detective informed Mr. Leonard he could not have an 
attorney appointed until he was arrested and then, at some later point an attorney would be 
provided. Id. In combination with the detective's earlier indication that Mr. Leonard needed to 
have his attorney contact him "immediately" and now was the time to give his side of the story, 
the detective effectively informed Mr. Leonard that he could not have an attorney until it was too 
late. 
Fmiher, the officer's advice was misleading and incorrect. The United States Supreme 
Court has upheld lvfiranda warnings that include the advice: "we have no way of you a 
lm:vyer, but one will be appointed for you, if you wish, if and when you go to court" because the 
advice accurately described the procedure for appointment of counsel in that state. Duckworth v. 
Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,203 (1989). The detective's indication to Mr. Leonard that he could not 
have an attorney appointed until he was arrested differs from the situation in Duckworth in two 
important respects. 
First, the detective's advice did not accurately reflect Idaho law with respect to the 
appointment of counsel. Unlike the fndiana statute discussed in Duckworth, Idaho statute 
provides that "a needy person who is being detained by a law enforcement officer, .. . or who is 
under formal charge of having committed ... a serious crime" is entitled "to be represented by an 
attorney to the same extent as a person having his own counsel is so entitled." LC. § l 9-852(a). 
Thus, the ofJicer's advice that Mr. Leonard would have to be arrested and presumably charged to 
obtain an attorney was inaccurate and, instead, one could be appointed during an investigative 
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detention. Further, although Mr. Leonard was not formally detained at the time, he was the prime 
suspect in the investigation and police had grounds to detain him. Law enforcement should not be 
able to deprive a person of the requested assistance of counsel during a pre-charge interrogation 
by simply declining to initiate a detention despite having grounds to do so. Indeed, this case 
illustrates how police could use such a tactic to convince a person to go ahead and submit to an 
interrogation without counsel's assistance. 
Second, the detective did not advise Mr. Leonard that no attorney could be appointed until 
he was arrested during the course of general Miranda warnings as occurred in Duckworth. 
Instead, the detective told Mr. Leonard no attorney could be appointed after Mr. Leonard 
requested one. Even more significant, the detective's advice that Mr. Leonard could not have an 
attorney appointed followed his indication to Mr. Leonard that he " needed to have that attorney 
contact me immediately." NPD Report Dated 1-8-2009, p. 3 (emphasis added). The detective had 
also told Mr. Leonard that now was his opportunity to tell his side of the story. Id. at p. 1. The 
detective thus communicated to Mr. Leonard that he would not be provided an attorney until after 
any benefit derived from the interrogation would be lost. The detective's conduct was all the 
more coercive because contrary to the information he provided Mr. Leonard, Idaho law does not 
require that a person be arrested in order to have counsel appointed. 
Finally, the district court erred in finding Mr. Leonard was not in custody when he 
confessed. The detective could have easily spoken Mr. Leonard at his residence since they had 
already arrived. Nevertheless, the detective transported Mr. Leonard back to the police dominated 
atmosphere of the police station. The lingering effects of the prior interrogation including the 
accusations of lying and the declaration things did not look good were still in full force. Mr. 
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Leonard had not only expressed his belief he was not competent to deal with police on his own by 
asking for an attorney, he had previously told law enforcement that he did not want to answer 
questions after the polygraph. Mr. Leonard's attempts to limit the scope of his engagement with 
law enforcement in addition to his announcement he did not believe himself competent to deal 
with the police, makes his subsequent "agreement" to forego counsel particularly suspect. 
Mr. Leonard agreed to an interrogation without an attorney after the detective told him an 
attorney needed to contact the detective "immediately" but that Mr. Leonard could not have an 
attorney appointed until he was arrested. The totality of the circumstances fails to show a valid 
waiver of the previously invoked right to counsel. 
3. Conclusion 
After being told he failed a polygraph, he was lying and things did not look good, Mr. 
Leonard invoked his right to counsel. Although the detectives discontinued ·questioning, they told 
Mr. Leonard that it was necessary for his attorney to contact them "immediately." When Mr. 
Leonard and the detective arrived at Mr. Leonard's residence, Mr. Leonard inquired how an 
attorney could be appointed to assist him since he could not afford one. The detective then 
misinformed Mr. Leonard that no attorney could be appointed until he was arrested, thus 
communicating it would be impossible for an attorney to contact the detective immediately as he 
said was necessary. The detective transported Mr. Leonard back to the police station where he 
submitted to further interrogation without an attorney present. 
These circumstances establish that Mr. Leonard's confession was taken without a valid 
waiver of his previously invoked right to counsel. Thus, had trial counsel filed a motion to 
suppress, that motion should have been granted and Mr. Leonard's confession could not have 
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been used against him at trial. With this critical evidence suppressed, there is a reasonable 
probability that but for counsel's failure to file the motion to suppress. the outcome of the case 
would have been different. Accordingly, Mr. Leonard has proven that he received ineffective 
assistance of counsel. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Mr. Leonard respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's judgment denying 
his post-conviction claims and to remand this case for further proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this / U day of July, 2012. 
NF~cKA Y & BARTLETT LLP 
Robyn Fyffe 
Attorney for Phillip Leonard Jr. 
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